I distinguish between two ways in which Kuhn employs the concept of incommensurability based on for whom it presents a problem. First, I argue that Kuhn’s early work focuses on the comparison and underdetermination problems scientists encounter during revolutionary periods whilst his later work focuses on the translation and interpretation problems analysts face when they engage in the representation of science from earlier periods. Secondly, I offer a new interpretation of actors’ incommensurability. I challenge Kuhn’s account of incommensurability which is (...) based on the compartmentalisation of the problems of both underdetermination and non-additivity to revolutionary periods. Through employing a finitist perspective, I demonstrate that in principle these are also problems scientists face during normal science. I argue that the reason why in certain circumstances scientists have little difficulty in concurring over their judgements of scientific findings and claims while in others they disagree needs to be explained sociologically rather than by reference to underdetermination or non-additivity. Thirdly, I claim that disagreements between scientists should not be couched in terms of translation or linguistic problems, but should be understood as arising out of scientists’ differing judgments about how to take scientific inquiry further.Keywords: Thomas Kuhn; Incommensurability; Normal science; Revolutionary science; SSK. (shrink)

Suppose we grant that evolutionary forces have had a profound effect on the contours of our normative judgments and intuitions. Can we conclude anything from this about the correct metaethical theory? I argue that, for the most part, we cannot. Focusing my attention on Sharon Street’s justly famous argument that the evolutionary origins of our normative judgments and intuitions cause insuperable epistemological difficulties for a metaethical view she calls "normative realism," I argue that there are two largely independent lines of (...) argument in Street’s work which need to be teased apart. The first of these involves a genuine appeal to evolutionary considerations, but it can fairly easily be met by her opponents. The second line of argument is more troubling; it raises a significant problem, one of the most difficult in all of philosophy, namely how to justify our reliance on our most basic cognitive faculties without relying on those same faculties in a question-begging manner. However, evolutionary considerations add little to this old problem, and rejecting normative realism is not a way to solve it. (shrink)

I argue—contra moderate grounding pluralists such as Kit Fine and more extreme grounding pluralists such as Jessica Wilson—that there is fundamentally only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation. I also argue that this single relation is indispensable for normative theorizing—that we can’t make sense of, for example, the debate over consequentialism without it. It follows from what I argue that there is no metaethically-pure normative ethics.

When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is “Yes, we should.” This essay argues to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior to (...) the right in ethics often leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what an agent should do, so too, this essay argues, taking the good to be prior to the right in epistemology leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what a subject should believe. Epistemic value—and, by extension, epistemic goals—are not the explanatory foundation upon which all other normative notions in epistemology rest. (shrink)

The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains. I argue that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds only if one assumes that, even in the limit of ideal reflection, the obtaining of the condition in question and one's beliefs about that condition can be radically disjoint from one another. However, no (...) self-respecting defender of the luminosity of the mental would ever make such an assumption. Thus Williamson can only secure his controversial claims in epistemology by taking for granted certain equally controversial claims in the philosophy of mind. What emerges is that the best bet for defending an internalist epistemology against Williamson's attack is to take there to be a tight, intimate connection between (to take one example) our experiences and our beliefs upon reflection about the obtaining of those experiences, or between (to take another example) the rationality of our beliefs and our beliefs upon reflection about the rationality of those beliefs. (shrink)

It has been claimed that the recent wave of neuroscientific research into the physiological underpinnings of our moral intuitions has normative implications. In particular, it has been claimed that this research discredits our deontological intuitions about cases, without discrediting our consequentialist intuitions about cases. In this paper I demur. I argue that such attempts to extract normative conclusions from neuroscientific research face a fundamental dilemma: either they focus on the emotional or evolved nature of the psychological processes underlying deontological intuitions, (...) in which case the arguments rely on a blatantly fallacious inference, or they appeal to the (alleged) moral irrelevance of the factors to which deontological intuitions respond, in which case the neuroscientific results end up playing no role in the overall argument. (shrink)

A quasi-sequel to "Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions." Covers some of the same ground, but also extends the basic argument in an important way.

Quasi-realists aim to account for many of the trappings of metanormative realism within an expressivist framework. Chief among these is the realist way of responding to the Euthyphro dilemma: quasi-realists want to join realists in being able to say, "It’s not the case that kicking dogs is wrong because we disapprove of it. Rather, we disapprove of kicking dogs because it’s wrong." However, the standard quasi-realist way of explaining what we are up to when we assert the first of these (...) two sentences rests on a mistaken identification of metaphysical dependence (or grounding) with counterfactual covariation. This chapter proposes a better way for expressivists to understand such sentences, on which they serve to express complex states of mind in which an attitude bears a relation of psychological dependence (or basing) to another state of mind. It is argued that this proposal is a natural, versatile, and fruitful approach for expressivists to take that helps them secure the first half of the Euthyphro contrast—but at the cost of making it difficult to see how expressivists can make sense of that contrast’s second half. (shrink)

This article deals with the elevation of the administrative status of Jerusalem from vilāya to niyāba and the impact of this transformation on the judicial organization and the appointments in the city. During the early Mamluk period, Jerusalem remained as wilāya, a less significant administrative unit, subordinate to the nā’ib of Damascus. However, in the later eighth/fourteenth century, the city was turned into a separate niyāba, an administrative unit governed by the viceroy (nā’ib al-saltana) of the sultan, and attached directly (...) to Cairo, the political centre of the Mamluks. While the existing scholarship tends to see this change as a manoeuvre against the Crusader threat, this article argues that the foundation of niyāba in Jerusalem was associated with the bureaucratic centralisation of the Mamluk Sultanate and the religious importance of the city. Unlike the Ayyubid politics of fragmented sovereignty between the dynasty members, the Mamluks appointed viceroys on behalf of the sultan to the significant cities of Syria. Therefore, the foundation of niyāba in Jerusalem can be seen as a continuation of this attempt toward the centralisation of the Syro-Egyptian lands. On the other hand, with this change, the Mamluk sultan had the opportunity to express his patronage over Jerusalem in a more powerful way and to control the administrative, judicial, and scholarly realms in the city directly. What is more important in terms of the judicial practices is that Jerusalem was introduced to four chief judgeships (Shāfi‘ī, Hanafī, Mālikī, and Hanbalī) within the thirty-year period after the founda-tion of niyāba. All these changes meant that the city became bureaucratically more integrated with Cairo so that the Cairene elite were increasingly in-volved in local appointments of scholars. Moreover, it became increasingly crucial for Jerusalemite scholars to have connections with Cairene bureaucrats in order to secure scholarly positions in Jerusalem. (shrink)

Are there practical reasons for and against belief? For example, do the practical benefits to oneself or others of holding a certain belief count in favor of that belief? I argue "No." My argument involves considering how practical reasons for belief, if there were such things, would combine with other reasons for belief in order to determine all-things-considered verdicts, especially in cases involving equally balanced reasons of either a practical or an epistemic sort.

The Qur'an is a holy book on which many studies have been carried out by both Muslims and non-Muslims. In terms of its religious and cultural origins, Turkey is one of the countries where the most research on the Qur'an has been conducted. However, the fact that the studies and contributions will be gain a more important place in the international arena, the articles written about Qur'an in Turkey be addressed in various aspects in this article. For this purpose, the (...) articles have been classified firstly by the contents. Thus, it has been questioned which topics have been researched much and which ones have been researched relatively less. Secondly, the article also aims to determine how many articles composed about Qur'an in an interdisciplinary manner. And the numerical changes of the articles are also examined yearly. In addition, the number of articles related with Qur'an and written in a language except for Turkish is also determined in the article. Based on that, some evaluations are made about these articles and their authors. Finally, some formal, contextual and scientific procedural errors in the articles written about Qur'an have been examined, and it has been investigated whether there have been ethical violations in the articles or not. Lastly, various suggestions to eliminate the deficiencies, have been suggested. Since the excessive increase in the number of articles after 2015 made the research difficult, the determinations in the article are limited to the articles between 1930 and 2015. (shrink)

Maḳâle fî ṣınâʿati'l-manṭıḳ, the only work of Maimonides on logic, has a distinctive feature in point of presenting a logical summary based on terms. This article shaped by titles, which evaluates the opinions here in the form of explanation, comparison and analysis for many reasons; philosophy of logic, preparation for logic, concepts, propositions, comparison and five arts. In the philosophy of logic, it is examined what kind of knowledge logic is in the context of its relationship with philosophy and sciences (...) and its necessity for the certainty of knowledge. In the logic preparation part, two basic problems, namely the concepts of relational existence and the theory of causality, are discussed. These are not direct problems of logic, but are considered as preparatory issues for a better understanding of logic. Five universals, categories and definition theory are included in the concepts. In the propositions section, propositions are discussed and evaluated according to their quality, quantity, counter-affirmation situations, modality and rotation situations. In the syllogism part, the basic concepts, figures, modes and types of qiyas are included. In the five arts section, the five arts and the propositions that can be precursors are emphasized. (shrink)

Moral properties are explained by other properties. And moral principles tell us about moral properties. How are these two ideas related? In particular, is the truth of a given moral principle part of what explains why a given action has a given moral property? I argue “No.” If moral principles are merely concerned with the extension of moral properties across all possible worlds, then they cannot be partial explainers of facts about the instantiation of those properties, since in general necessitation (...) does not suffice for explanation. And if moral principles are themselves about what explains the moral properties under their purview, then by their own lights they are not needed in order to explain those moral properties’ instantiation—unless, that is, the principles exhibit an objectionable form of metaphysical circularity. So moral principles cannot explain why individual actions have moral properties. Nor, I also argue, can they explain why certain other factors explain why those actions have the moral properties that they do, or in some other way govern or mediate such first-order explanations of particular moral facts. When it comes to the explanation of an individual action’s specific moral features, moral principles are explanatorily idle. (shrink)

I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my challenge: two of the cases he discusses I never claimed to be counterexamples to process reliabilism. Second, Goldman’s reply to the type of case I actually claimed to be a counterexample to process reliabilism is unsuccessful. He proposes a variety of responses, but all of them either feature an implausible restriction (...) on process types, or fail to rule out cases with the sort of structure that generates the worry, or both. (shrink)

Guilt and fear today have developed an unexpected quality: they contribute powerfully to the survival of humanity. The feeling of guilt proceeds from an elementary awareness: although the unequaled progress of science and technology in the twentieth century has undoubtedly ameliorated the conditions of human life, it also has given rise to an infernal logic of genocide and crimes against humanity, in which almost all nations, directly or indirectly, have participated and participate still. This awareness is joined to another, which (...) is itself accompanied by a primordial fear: for the first time in history, science and technology have endowed humanity with the power to destroy itself and the planet, without furnishing humans with the means of escaping their destined role as sorcerer's apprentice, for no science can tell us what to do with science. It is this double feeling of guilt and fear that pushes contemporary man to search feverishly for ethical foundations capable of furnishing discreet regulatory principles to underpin decisions and actions. From the point of view of contemporary humanity, ethics must be able to confer meaning and perspective on an existence which apparently has neither: “Now,” writes Hans Jonas, “we shiver in the nakedness of nihilism in which near-omnipotence is paired with near-emptiness, greatest capacity with knowing least for what ends to use it.”. (shrink)

Ten years ago, an issue of the journal L'Homme et la Société was entitled “La Mode des identités.” Most of the articles were about cultural identity, but the basic thrust of the work was “a critique of the ‘fashion’ of identity calling into question the validity of a notion as striking as it is uncertain.” Recently, a special issue of the journal Sciences Humaines, entitled “Identité et identités,” dealt with personal, familial, social, professional identities and only spoke of cultural identity (...) marginally and in a roundabout way. Finally, in a manual of Sociologie politique published by the Presses Universitaires de France, the author takes to task the notion of ethnicity inherent to cultural identity and pushes the critique of the ethnic group to the point of negating its objective existence. Must we think then that the notion of cultural identity is henceforth obsolete, that it has lost all pertinence? (shrink)

Once upon a time, coherentism was the dominant response to the regress problem in epistemology, but in recent decades the view has fallen into disrepute: now almost everyone is a foundationalist (with a few infinitists sprinkled here and there). In this paper, I sketch a new way of thinking about coherentism, and show how it avoids many of the problems often thought fatal for the view, including the isolation objection, worries over circularity, and concerns that the concept of coherence is (...) too vague or metaphorical for serious theoretical use. The key to my approach is to take a familiar tool from discussions of the regress problem -- namely, directed graphs depicting the support relations between beliefs -- and to use that tool in a more sophisticated manner than it is standardly employed. (shrink)

Moral particularists argue that because reasons for action are irreducibly context-dependent, the traditional quest in ethics for true and exceptionless moral principles is hopelessly misguided. In making this claim, particularists assume a general framework according to which reasons are the ground floor normative units undergirding all other normative properties and relations. They then argue that there is no cashing out in finite terms either (i) when a given non-normative feature gives rise to a reason for or against action, or (ii) (...) how the reasons that are present in a given context play off each other to determine one’s overall duties. However, the conjunction of these two theses leaves particularists without a coherent notion of a reason for action: posit too much irreducible context-dependence in the behavior of reasons, and the reasons-based framework breaks down. One upshot is that the particularists’ challenge to principle-based approaches to ethics has not, at present, been successfully made out; another upshot is that perhaps the best way to formulate that challenge involves renouncing the reasons-based framework all together. (shrink)

After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.

Bu makale, Ebu’l-Muʿîn en-Nesefî’nin peygamberliğin aklî olarak gerekçelendirilmesine yönelik ortaya koyduğu rasyonel argümanlarını ele almaktadır. Makale, tartışmaya en-Nesefî’nin peygamberlik kavramından ne anladığını ele alarak başlar ve onun tarafından kavramın lügavî, felsefî ve kelâmî anlamlarına dair sunulan görüşler tasnif edilir. Ardından, en-Nesefî’de nübüvvetin, aklî açıdan mümkün ve Allah’ın hikmeti açısından vâcib olmak üzere, iki farklı kategorik açıdan ele alınışı işlenir. En-Nesefî nübüvvetin hem aklen mümkün oluşuna hem de onun Allah’ın hikmeti gereği gerekli oluşuna dair birçok argüman sunar. İnsan aklının bilgiye ulaşma (...) kapasitesinin sınırlı oluşu, dini bilginin açık ve sarih bir şekilde ortaya konulmasının gerekliliği ve yine gelecek nesiller için bu bilginin korunmasına ve depolanmasına duyulan ihtiyaç peygamberlik müessesesinin makul, mümkün ve gerekli oluşuna dair çok değerli iç görüler sunar. En-Nesefî’ye göre “yıldızların ilmi veya bilgisi” ve tıp bilimine dair insanlığın sahip olduğu malumat, yine insanların yaşamlarını devam ettirebilmeleri için gerekli olan kimi sanat ve zanaatkarlığa dair önemli bilgilerin öğrenilip bu güne aktarılmış olması peygamberlik müessesesinin tarihte gerçekleşmiş bir vakıa olduğunu gösteren aklî çıkarımlardandır. Dahası en-Nesefî’ye göre insanlar arasındaki ilk dil de bir peygamber tarafından öğretilmiş ve diğer diller bu ilk dilden türemiştir. Makalenin ikinci kısmı, en-Nesefî’nin nübüvvet iddiasında bulunan birinin iddiasının geçerli olup olmadığına dair sunduğu kriterler ya da kıstaslar üzerine yoğunlaşır. En-Nesefî peygamberlik iddiasında bulunan birisinin iddiasını temellendirmesinin en etkili yolunu mucize olarak görür. Ardından mucizenin tanımına ve onun kelâmî ve felsefî gelenekler içerisinde nasıl anlaşıldığına dair bazı açıklamalar yapar ve mucizenin sıhhatine dair şartları tartışır. Örneğin mucizeler, becerilerini mükemmelleştirmek için yıllarını harcamış sihirbazlar tarafından gerçekleştirilen illüzyonlardan veya sihir numaralarından ayrılır. Bu kişiler, el çabukluğu kullanarak olağanüstü görünen numaralar sergileyebilirler çünkü onlar göz yanılması sayesinde izleyicileri aldatmaya yönelik zengin bir deneyim ve uzmanlığa sahiptirler. Bununla birlikte, daha yakından incelenip derinlemesine düşünüldüğünde, illüzyon numaralarının ardındaki nedenler keşfedildikçe, hilelerinin gizemi ve gücü yavaş yavaş azalır. Fakat, mucizeler araştırıldıkça ve üzerine düşünüldükçe giderek daha kesin ve güçlü hale gelirler. Sonuç olarak en-Nesefî’ye göre sadece entelektüel bir Tanrı anlayışı ya da inancı kişiyi din tarafından müjdelenen mutluluğa ulaştırmak için yeterli değildir. Kişinin dünya üzerindeki varlığını tatmin edici bir anlama (hikmet) bağlayabilmesinin, yine hem bu dünyaya hem de öbür dünyaya dair menfaatlerinin farkında olup onları elde etmeyi öğrenmesinin yegâne yolu peygamberlik müessesesidir. Özetle, bu makale, en-Nesefî’de nübüvvet kavramının kapsamlı bir analizini ortaya koyarak ve onun nübüvveti destekleyen rasyonel argümanlarını tartışarak, İslam düşüncesinde nübüvvet kavramının ve nübüvvete getirilen aklî savunuların daha derin bir şekilde anlaşılmasına katkıda bulunmayı ve yapılacak olan muhtemel modern aklî savunuların hangi hususlara odaklanması ya da mecralara yönelmesi gerektiğinin ipuçlarını ortaya koymayı hedeflemektedir. (shrink)

Müslüman bilim adamları, namaz vakitlerinin hesaplanması, kıble yönünün tespit edilmesi gibi nedenlerden dolayı astronomi ilmi ile İslam’ın erken dönemlerinden itibaren ilgilenmeye başlamışlardır. Bu bilim dalıyla yakından ilişkili olduğu düşünülen İlm-i aḥkâm-ı nücûm’un, astronominin bir parçası olduğu iddia edenler de olmuştur. Ancak, içindeki “ahkâm” ifadesi nedeniyle birçok ilim adamı bilimler tasnifinde, İlm-i aḥkâm-ı nücûm’u, astronomiden ayrı tutmuş onu doğal ilimlerden saymamışlardır. Birçok İslam Devleti’nin yöneticisine çeşitli ahkâm risaleleri sunulsa da müneccimbaşılık bağımsız bir kurum olarak Osmanlı Devleti zamanında, II. Bayezid döneminde teşkilatlanmıştır. (...) Bu dönemde müneccimbaşı, ikinci müneccim ve müneccimlerden oluşan bir heyet oluşturulmuş, zaman zaman birtakım değişikliklere uğrasa da kurum varlığını Cumhuriyet’e kadar devam ettirmiştir. Bu makalenin amacı Osmanlı Devleti’nin bir kurumu olan Müneccimbaşılık kurumu hakkında bilgi vermek ve 1712 yılında yayımlanmış bir ahkam risalesinden yola çıkarak bu tür risalelerde hangi konuların ele alındığını ortaya koymaktır. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Osmanlı Arşivinde tespit edilen belgeler ışığında bu çalışma yapılmıştır. Yöntem olarak Arşiv ve literatür taraması yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Makalenin cevap aradığı soruların başında Kur’an-ı Kerim ve Hadislerde gaybın bilgisinin yalnız Allah’ta olduğu vurgulanmasına rağmen Osmanlı devletinde bu kurumun varlığını nasıl devam ettirdiği ve bu ilimle uğraşanların bu eleştirilere nasıl cevap verdiği, ahkamlarda hangi konulara değinildiği? Gibi konular gelmektedir. Makalede ulaşılan bazı bulgular şunlardır: Bu kurumun temel görevi namaz vakitlerinin belirlenmesi, ramazan hilalinin gözlemlenmesi, eşref saatinin tespit edilmesidir. Bununla birlikte bir yıl içerisinde meydana gelecek olan olayların bilgisine de ahkâm kısmında yer verilmektedir. Bazı padişahlar yapacakları işleri müneccimbaşının bilgi notları doğrultusunda gerçekleştirmeyi önemsemişler, hatta farklı coğrafyalardaki yöneticilerden müneccim talebinde bulunmuşlar, bazıları ise önemsememişlerdir. Bu ilimle uğraşanlar genellikle usta çırak ilişkisi içerisinde yetişmişlerdir. Bununla birlikte farklı meslek gruplarına mensup olanlardan da bu ilme heves edenler ortaya çıkmış, kendilerinin görevleri olmadıkları halde ahkâmlar hazırlamışlar ve bu ahkâmları padişahlara sunmuşlardır. Bunlardan biri de Vakanüvis Naîmâ Efendi’dir. İlk resmi Osmanlı Vakanuvisi olan Naîmâ 17. yüzyılın sonları 18. yüzyılın başlarında değişik idari görevlerde bulunmuştur. İki defa görevinden azledilmiş dönemi araştıran tarihçiler tarafından buna gerekçe olarak Naîmâ’nın düzenlemiş olduğu ahkamlar gösterilmiştir. Naîmâ bu ahkamlarda kendince tespit edebildiği olumsuzlukları açık bir şekilde kamuoyu ile paylaşmıştır. Bu da dönemin idarecilerinin düşmanlığını kazanmasına neden olmuştur. Ancak Naîmâ ahkam yazmaya devam etmiş, yüksek bürokrasiye dönebilmek için 1712 yılı için hazırladığı ahkamında siyasi bir dil kullanmıştır. Ona göre bu bir ilimdir ve bu ilimle uğraşmak İslam’a aykırı bir durum değildir. Verdiği bilgiler ise iddiadan uzaktır. Mesela padişahın yaşamını sıhhatli bir şekilde uzun süre devam ettireceğini, 1712 yılı için bir iki çocuk sahibi olabileceğini, gezegenlerin konumlarından deprem ve yangın emaresi olduğunu, ancak bu yangın ve depremlerin gerçekleşme ihtimalinin düşük olduğunu risalesinde belirtmiştir. Devletin eski gücüne kavuşması için yapılması gerekenlere de değinilmiştir. Üzerinde durduğu önemli konulardan biri donanmadır. Donanmanın güçlendirilmesi için sicili temiz, görev bilincine sahip yetenekli denizcilerin istihdam edilmesini, korsanlık yaparak, halkın malını, canını tehdit edenlerin ise yakalanıp cezalandırmasını önermiştir. Devlet bürokrasisinde liyakatli kişilere görev verilmesinin önemi üzerinde durmuş, bununla birlikte kendisine üst düzey bir görev verilmesini de istemiştir. Ona öre eski ihtişamlı günlere tekrar kavuşmak için taşraya atanan bürokratların işin ehli olanlar arasından seçilmesi gelmektedir. Yine istikrarı sağlamak ve devam ettirebilmek için teftiş önemlidir. Denetim mekanizması çalıştırılmalı yetersizlik gösterenler yolsuzluk yapanlar halka zulmedenler derhal görevden alınmalıdır. Devletin halk içerisinde güveni yeniden tesis etmesi için asayiş olanlara karışanları cezalandırmasını, cezasını çekip ıslah olmuşlara da af çıkarmasını tavsiye etmiştir. Devletin gerilemesindeki iç nedenler üzerinde durmuş ancak dış nedenler üzerinde durmamıştır. Bununla birlikte pozitif bilimlere önem verilmesine değinmiştir. Osmanlının sürekli mücadele içerisinde olduğu Batı’nın hızlı bir şekilde ilerlemesi üzerinde yani her ne kadar gerilemenin dış sebepleri üzerinde durmuş olmasa da pozitif bilimlere önem verilmesi üzerinde durmuştur. (shrink)

Nazariyat, Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences, issued twice a year in English and Turkish (Nazariyat İslam Felsefe ve Bilim Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi), is a refereed international journal. It publishes original studies, critical editions of classical texts and book reviews on Islamic philosophy, kalām, theoretical aspects of Sufism and the history of sciences. The goal of Nazariyat is to contribute to the discovery, examination and reinterpretation of the theoretical traditions in the history of Islamic thought, by giving (...) special attention to the post-classical period of it. **ISSN: 2148-8088 E-ISBN: 2547-9415**. (shrink)

Abstract:Atmosphere in architecture acts as a communication tool between the space and its experiencers. This tool has the potential of being detached from the physical environment and conveyed by memories and imagination, which may augment the physical environment in a poetic way. This paper aims to demonstrate this potential by utilizing the technique of comparative reading using unmanipulated photographs of physical space, computer- generated film/images of the same space, and a spatial narration/text, all in the context of Japanese architecture. By (...) viewing this context from a lens focused on the intersection of aesthetics, phenomenology, and architecture, the study points out the possibility of utilizing atmosphere as a tool to convey ideas and augment the aesthetic experience through different techniques of representation. In this way, it highlights the importance of the narrative quality of spatial atmosphere in architectural design, and its potential as a transposable spatial identity. (shrink)

Immortality, or life after death one of the deep-rooted problamatics that most noteworthy backgrounded and never losing its freshness, in the philosophic-thelogical custom. While the expectations of people about the next life, is satisfied as ‘resurrection’ by the theistic beliefs doctorines-thoughts, it is also answered as ‘soul immortality’ by the philosophical approaches. But it is impossible to say both thesis have smootly aspects. In this study, we will rank how this ancient problematic in the history of thought is dealt with (...) in Mulla Sadra's philosophy. Sadra offers an original doctrine of resurrection, which is based on the existential evolution of the self and continues to develop in a continuous process. This doctrine, in which the theories of substantive movement, abstractness of imagination and selestial-spiritual bodies are used as basic parameters, is a critical answer to the philosophical doctrine that acknowledges the continuity of spiritual existence with the classical thelogical thought that advocates the return of worldly bodies. In this respect, it appears as a third alternative alternative for Islamic eschatology, trapped between theories of de resurrection through biological body and spiritual immortality. (shrink)

This study focuses on implementing electric vehicles (EVs) in developing countries where energy production is mainly based on fossil fuels. Although for these countries the environmental short-run benefits of the EVs cannot offset the short-run costs, it may still be the best option to implement the EVs as soon as possible. Hence, it is necessary to evaluate the alternatives to introducing EVs to the market due to the environmental concerns that created an opportunity for some developing countries to catch up (...) with the international competition. Therefore, we develop a case scenario to explore the decision-making process in implementing the EVs with three alter natives and twelve criteria. We solve the decision-making problem by using Type-2 neutrosophic numbers (T2NNs) based on the RAFSI (Ranking of Alternatives through Functional mapping of criterion sub-intervals into a Single Interval) method. The proposed model combines the advantages of the RAFSI technique, and it applies T2NNs to address the uncertainties. The results show that the alternatives that may suspend the implementation of the EVs are inferior. Direct implementation of EVs is prioritized. The policy implications of the results are discussed in the study. (shrink)

A religião tem um relevante papel de modelagem da vida social na história humana. Em todas as sociedades organizadas e não organizadas, a influência da religião na organização da vida social do indivíduo é realmente grande. Além dos laços legais que unem as pessoas na sociedade, os laços religiosos também são importantes. Em suma, a afirmação “A história da humanidade é moldada pela profunda influência da religião” não deve ser subestimada. Este estudo aborda como Spinoza define os conceitos de Deus, (...) mente e autoridade. (shrink)

Duygular; insanın epistemik, etik ve estetik yönleriyle doğrudan ilişkili varoluşsal özniteliklerdir. İnsan anlam-lı, değerli ve güzel bir hayat kurarken akılla birlikte duygulardan motivasyon almaktadır. Duygular, çok fonk-siyonlu yapısıyla insanın niyet, tutum, tavır ve eylemlerini belirleme, harekete geçirme, yönlendirme, etkile-me, dönüştürme, frenleme ve bazen de manipüle etme araçlarıdır. Bu nedenle ahlak başta olmak üzere insan eylemlerini problem edinen her araştırma, duyguları ele almak durumun¬dadır. İnsanı tam anlamıyla tanıma-nın yolu, pratik yaşantısı içerisinde ortaya çıkan duygusallığını anlamaktan geçer. Dolayısıyla teorik olanın durağanlığı ile (...) hayatın akışkanlığı arasındaki uçurumda duygular, felsefi bir soruşturmanın konusu olmakta-dır. Duygunun dinamik yapısını ve sınır çizilemeyen doğasını dilin sınırları içerisinde ifade etmek kolay değildir. Bu-nunla birlikte insan için duygular, kendini, evreni, doğayı, maddeyi, bireyleri, toplumları, iyiyi, kötüyü, değerli olanı ve olmayanı anladığı, olgu ve olaylarla başa çıktığı, pratik hayatını yönettiği, karar verme süreçlerinde, niyetlerinde, yönelimlerinde ve seçimlerinde etkin, tüm bu süreçlere içkin, dinamik, fonksiyonel ve bilişsel öznitelikler olarak öne çıkmaktadır. İnsan, günlük yaşamı içinde çok çeşitli duygu durumlarını tecrübe etmek-tedir. Böylece o, tecrübe ettiği bu duygu durumları ile sürekli değişen ruh hallerine sahip olmaktadır. Bu tec-rübeler, dış etkenlere bağlı olabildiği gibi insanın içsel dinamiklerinin etkisiyle de ortaya çıkabil¬mektedir. Sosyal yaşantısı itibariyle insan, duygusal tepkiler veren ve duygusal etkiler alan dinamik bir ahlak yaşantısı-na sahiptir. Bu bağlamda duygular, insanın kendi benliği ile yaşadığı toplumun benliği arasında denge kurma-sını sağlamakta ve insanın temel yönelimlerini belirlemektedir. Duygular, insana eylem motivasyonu kazan-dıran, onun tasavvurlarına, geçmiş, şimdi ve gelecekle ilgili değerlendirmelerine yön veren, harekete geçirici yetilerdir. Pişmanlık, bizzat benliğe yönelen ve onun ahlâkîliğini içsel olarak düzenleyip inşa eden ahlâkî bir özdenetim duygusudur. Bu duygu gerek bireysel ve gerekse sosyal yaşamda insanı etkileyen doğasıyla özel-likle ahlâkî değer dünyasında merkezi bir rol oynamaktadır. Pişmanlık, en yalın haliyle insanın geçmişteki eylemine ya da eylemsizliğine dönük olumsuz yargısını içeren acı bir his biçiminde ortaya çıkmakta ve keşke ifadesiyle dile gelmektedir. Pişmanlık duygusu insanda içsel tesirlerin etkisiyle oluşmaktadır. Çoğu ahlak duygusu gibi pişmanlık da hem fenomenolojik bir duyuş hem de bilişsel bir yargı içermektedir. Psikolojik ve kavramsal açıdan karmaşık bir duygu olan pişmanlık; üzüntü, hayal kırıklığı, özlem, nostalji ve bazen bir şey-den pişmanlık duymamanın verdiği rahatlama gibi bir dizi duyguyu ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Pişmanlık aynı zamanda güçlü, motive edici bir üzüntü ve işlerin istendiği gibi gitmediğine dair tutkulu bir şikâyet olarak da kendini gösterebilmektedir. O, bugünümüzü ve geleceğimizi şekillendiren genellikle geçmişe dönük bir acı deneyimidir. Pişmanlık, genellikle kişinin yaptığı şeyi onaylamadığını, farklı şekilde olmasını arzuladığını, üzüldüğünü, utandığını veya suçlu olduğunu ifade eden ve farkındalıkla ortaya çıkan bir duygudur. Pişmanlık, insanı geçmişteki ve şimdiki hatalarından ders çıkarmaya ve gelecekteki davranışlarını düzeltmeye teşvik eden, insanın özdenetim yeteneğinin bir parçasıdır. Bu duygu, kişinin kendi eylemleriyle ilgili içsel muhasebe-sinin bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan düzeltici ve iyileştirici ahlaki bir özdenetim duygusudur. Pişmanlık, insa-nın ahlaki doğasının zorunlu bir sonucudur. Bu duygu onun seçim yapabilen bir varlık olmasından, yani ahlaki özgürlüğünden kaynaklanmaktadır. Pişmanlığın oluşabilmesi için ahlaki eylemin en az iki seçenek arasından yapılacak bir seçim sonucunda gerçekleşmiş olması gerekir. Bu nedenle, pişmanlığın ön koşulu özgürlüktür. Akıl ve duygunun düşüncelerimiz ve eylemlerimiz üzerindeki karşılıklı rolleri, özellikle pişmanlık olgusunda belirgindir. Dolayısıyla ister pratik ister teorik alanda olsun pişmanlık, sadece insanın duygusal yanıyla değil, bilişsel yanıyla da ilgili bir duygudur. Pişmanlığın, geçmişte yaşanmış veya bugün etkisi devam eden bir olgu üzerinde kişinin hatasını fark etmesiyle oluşan bir üzüntü hali olması, onun bir değerlendirme duygusu oldu-ğunu gösterir. Duyguların harekete geçirici yönü pişmanlıkta geriye doğru işlevsiz olacağından, bu teşvik edici yön gelecekte pişmanlık yaratan durumun tekrarını önleme yönünde kendini göstermektedir. Böylece geç-mişte yaşanan üzücü bir durum, olumsuzdan olumluya, yıkıcıdan yapıcıya doğru ahlaki bir evrime zemin hazırlayacaktır. Bu makalede duygu etiğinin ilkeleri, kavramsal ve kuramsal çerçevesi göz önünde bulundurulmak suretiyle pişmanlık duygusunun mahiyeti, değeri ve fonksiyonelliği felsefî açıdan analiz edilip yorumlanacaktır. (shrink)

According to Ibn Khaldūn, man is a social entity deeply influenced by the geo-economics-politics of the environment in which he lives. The effect is seen as so strong that nearly all of these structures in their relationship to human beings are dominated by it. In this system, we see human beings as a creature who is both able to adapt himself to the environment and able to evolve in this harmony. From the perspective of Ibn Khaldūn, man cannot be evaluated (...) or defined separately from the environmental conditions, the technique and architecture he has developed. Ibn Khaldūn sees the primary source of this change to be the desire to make life both more prosperous and bearable. Therefore, the most natural motivations that affect man’s desire to alter the natural world are the environmental challenges that he encounters. The challenges that are imposed upon man in the natural world are those that have led to human progress. From badāwa (nomadic society) to ḥaḍāra (sedentary society) and so to the ceaseless drive of human progress that has served to make life more endurable, every effort in this sense leads to a physical and moral loosening as the incessant struggle to survive that defines human existence is made more bearable. Physical slack by breaking the resistance of man to resist the environmental conditions; and moral looseness by making man more vulnerable to the temptation of desires, pleasures and welfare that are the cause of moral dilemmas. Ibn Khaldūn’s moral thought with its social, political, and other fields of application are all contexts that enable an understanding of the devaluation of money-hedonist morality in all ways. This article aims to analyze the social, political and economic dilemmas and challenges that the capitalist, consumption-based money-hedonist morality (obesity, social media addiction, consumption, and moral devaluation in the face of financial, virtual and imagined valuations, etc.) from the perspective of Ibn Khaldūn. Summary: Man is endowed with both good and evil. Ibn Khaldūn notes that man tends to misuse these two orientations with a higher inclination towards evil, and that social conditions have an effect on this. He sees another characteristic of man, that they develop habits; accordingly, man is the child of his habits. Habits are second nature to man and affects all of his perceptions, particularly notions concerning truth. At the same time, human beings are under the constant influence of both habits, culture, and climate and geography; and all of these together affect our ethics, psychology and characteristics. Thus, man is a historical, social being that is changed, transformed and determined by adapting to these cultural, social, political and ecological conditions. The concept of Money-Hedonism is one that we have created by combining the terms monetarism, an economic concept, and hedonism, a concept in moral philosophy; the resulting term we seek to produce essentially translates as the adoration of Money. As is well known, hedonism refers to a philosophy of life that has its origins in the ancient Greek world which sees the purpose of life as one in which the pursuit of pleasure is the highest good. Whereas, Monetarism is an American-based economic view developed by Milton Friedman in 1970, linking all the balance in the economy to the supply and demand of money. According to this, the demand for money is operation, precaution and motives of speculation of individuals the amount of money they want to keep in cash on them. The power of an exchange tool increases with the amount and quality of what it is achievable in its utilization. In this respect, money has been an unprecedented source of power in modern society as a means by which change can be achieved. The increase in the power of money as an effective means as manifesting power has led to a socio-cultural and socio-economic superstructure around this power. In the life of an individual that is part of such a culture and is unable to isolate himself from the economy in which he lives, the values that can be expressed with money are consequently formed. In this structure, since the measure of life is money, money determines the quality of human life and human pleasure to a far greater degree than at any time in history. Thus, those living in this age have developed a new moral philosophy of value formed by the combination of these two concepts (monetarism and hedonism), which we have defined as Money-Hedonism. The money-hedonist individual is one that is in love with money, the joy of having it, the pleasure of using it, who desires it with immeasurable passion and ambition and is willing to use all legitimate and illegitimate methods of obtaining it. The most prominent characteristics of this type of individual is egoism, a desire to possess, hatred and mistrust. Ibn Khaldūn argues that the inhabitants of a city that live a settled life and who are living in the city have become economically prosperous and absorbed by consumption and pleasure, and, consequently morally degenerate as a result of the abuse of their evil nature. As can be understood from Ibn Khaldūn’s explanations, the basic element that determines the transition of people from the badāwi way of life to ḥaḍāri (settled) is the change in the livelihoods and related needs. He perceives this change as progressing from necessity to luxury, and, with this change, ethical concern in the nature of people being replaced by aesthetic care. In this way, since aesthetic concern reveals the dissatisfaction of the human self, man always pursues what is perceived to be better and more beautiful, and therefore he easily tends to any malignancy that may disrupt his religious and worldly peace. The ḥaḍāra community of Ibn Khaldūn versus the badāwa represent a modern society with a much more heterogeneous population, with a significant increase in lifestyle diversity along with urbanization. However, the determinative effect of the relationship with nature or the way in which society engage in economic activities have not changed. While modern people are urbanized, they are also heterogeneously shaped by psycho-social necessities demanded by urbanization. Man has created a new socio-psychological condition that not only affects the socio-economic but the way of forming a relationship through the accelerated development of new communication methods, facilitating access to information, and the opening of new methods of communication field between institutions. While man’s connection to nature has become disconnected, he no longer perceives himself as human being in nature but as a human within the city, the individual urban life and the law define this perception. The rupture from nature has created an inevitable result of alienation to nature as well as the estrangement of man with his own nature. The liberal policies adopted with capitalism have encouraged competition and free entrepreneurship. In the time that Ibn Khaldūn lived, man who created himself with his struggle in the nature brings himself / herself into the economic structure of competition in the modern period. Unlike in more traditional societies of the past, the modern way of life not only expresses itself in our new way of life and moral values, but also by statistical values. The exploitative and mathematical world, which forms the current economic science, shapes the socio-economic and socio-psychological structure of modern man. It is understood that the life brought by luxury renders the dynamic, subjective, disciplined sense of morality dysfunctional by destroying the moral values of man, particularly by reducing their feeling of shame. As a result, while the world of value of money-hedonism is solid, materialistic and cold; man in trying to exist in this world of value carries a flexible, spiritual and emotional nature. As such, human beings are pushed into social anomaly situations such as a constant conflict, dilemma, suicide, insecurity and solitude in this world of value. (shrink)

Günümüzde insan zihni çeşitli algı yönetimi metodlarıyla saldırıya mâruz kalmaktadır. Medya insan algılarını yönetmekte sıkça başvurulan bir araçtır. Bu yöntemlerin etkisiyle insanlar gerçeklerden daha çok algılarına göre hareket etmektedir. Oysa algılar her zaman gerçeğe tekabül etmez. Bu bağlamda Batı dünyasının yeni ötekisi/düşmanı Müslümanlar hakkındaki olumsuz algı en çok Kur’an-ı Kerim üzerinden oluşturulur. Araştırmamızda güncel algılara aykırı görünen iki örnek Kur’an perspektifinden incelenmektedir. Bu meseleler Hz. Muhammed’in Hz. Aişe ve Hz. Zeyneb’le yaptığı evlilikler, çok evlilik mevzusu ve kölelik meselesidir. Çalışmamız nitel (...) bir araştırma olup literatür taramasına dayanmaktadır. Öncelikle bu konuların Hicaz-Arap kültüründe ve Kur’an’da nasıl yer aldığı ele alınmaktadır. Örnek olarak incelenen uygulamaların var olan kültüre uygunluğu müşrik, Yahudi ve münafıkların meseleye bakışıyla ortaya konulmaktadır. Ardından bu hususlarla ilgili oryantalist ve ülkemizdeki İslam dinine önyargılı bazı yazarların iddialarına yer verilmektedir. Araştırmacıların artık bigâne kalamayacağı sosyal medyadan da bazı örneklerden istifade edilmektedir. Nihayetinde şöyle bir tablo ortaya çıkmaktadır. Güncel algı, önce değer haline getirilmekte; daha sonra da bu algı başka zamanlara teşmil edilerek değerlendirme ölçütü olmakta ve bu ölçüye uymayan farklı uygulamalar itibarsızlaştırılmaya çalışılmaktadır. Kur’an ayetleri başta olmak üzere klasik eserlerdeki rivayetlerden hareketle bir itibarsızlaştırma faaliyeti yapılmaktadır. Fakat Kur’an-ı Kerim ayetleri sosyo-kültürel ortamlarından uzak bir şekilde literal okunarak çarpıtma yapılmakta ve genellikle anakronizme düşülmektedir. (shrink)